In between the fragments of Rui An’s historiographical forensics and Spahr’s ars poetica irrupts Bill Dietz’s polemic against art, that’s presented as a draft, marked up with edits and revisions. It borrows quotes from Saidiya Hartman and CLR James towards an abolitionist position of an art that is constitutively defined as ‘white, heterosexist, [and] genocidal…’ The piece veers in many directions through Soviet constructivist design, Henry Flynt, mukbang videos, CLR James on cricket, Shakespeare, Eisenstein, and so on towards a fuzzy sentiment of ‘solidarity’. It came across to me as feeling excessively digressive and libidinal. There’s a questionable grandiosity and sensationalism in this kind of polemic that opens with art as a genocidal machine of undifferentiated whiteness and proceeds through a libidinal mess of lazily related concepts, and ends with hallow signaling of ‘solidarity’. It makes me want to take a shower.
I found Rosalind Morris’, text message conversation and related essay cogent and well written. I had been recently struggling with a film project of hers that involved editing the GoPro footage of South African miners in a way that fits within a quote she borrows in her essay from the editors of commune who offer ‘today, with increasing clarity, modern art can be recognized as a form of appropriating artistic labor.’ In the same essay Morris expresses some misgivings about Marten’s (unfortunately yet to be translated to English) notion of life-work that they offer as a ‘question whether the designation or valorization of Lebensarbeit [life-work] as an aesthetic practice does not smuggle back into the sphere of artful but art-less anti-modernism, the dream of a final judgment—even as it relinquishes the task and the possibility of a criticality liberated from possessive individualism.’ I was intuiting a similar concern about the juridcical implications of this notion with my inference of the concept from the Illiberal Arts catalogue, if not quite possessing a clear idea of what ‘artful but art-less antimodernism’ might be—a pleasantly ambiguous formulation that could suggest a number of valances towards how art could be interpellated that still appear beholden to a juridical sovereign. The essay goes on to caution against the universalizing tendencies of liberal historicization from which much of the work surveyed in illiberal arts departs from. In a shift of tone, an unnamed voice, described as an ‘aging woman,’ offers ‘let us not forget how often and predictably the sign of the new, rather than, for example, the otherwise, shelters the fetish of virile youth. Nor lose track of the frequency with which it is accompanied by the masculinist celebration of passionate intensities masquerading as anti-bourgeois radicalism.’
I would like to add a small addendum to the 12th section of Steve Reinke’s delightful monologues for an arrow pointing to a hole. If it’s not too late, Steve, when you go to south side of Chicago as part of the artist in a classroom program and offer to children that every crayon in the box was once a human spirit and so whatever they are drawing—a dog or a pond—they are really drawing that spirit, I might add something about the labor conditions of the people that produced the crayons.
Not unlike Deitz, Aristilde Paz Justine Kirby weaves a cosmology from disparate sources, among them; a triad of characters in an Ingres painting, a scene with Liv Ullmann in Carlmar’s The Wayward Girl, a Drake lyric, some Gayle Rubin quotes, the ‘bottoming out of the cut flower business’ as articulated in the Ecuadorian highlands, a Dutch flower facility the size of 75 soccer fields and the COVID postponed wedding plans of a young MoMA employee. This kind of writing, from deterritorialized forms of loosened subjectivities, is enjoyable—and even more so when it cedes its authoritative voice. As in, I prefer the tone of ‘if you ask me, bridewealth is the Lacanian sinthome for this topologic network of nested societies we call the world: the key to its dissolution.’ more than ‘the abuse of the bridewealth is a catalyst of capitalism & makes eunuchs of us all.’ But these are minor preferences and I’m rehearsed in running an internal program that transforms declarative statements into open questions, e.g is the catalyzing abuse of the bridewealth that is constitutive of capitalism making eunuchs of us all?
If this volume suggests a contemporary vogue for the cobbling together of disparate seeming epistemes, Övül Durmusoglu offers a longer tradition, with a bizarre history of Turkish speculative nation-building, instantiated by characters like Helena Blavatsky whose writings drew ‘from Neoplatonism, renaissance magic, Kabbalah, and Freemasonry, along with ancient Egyptian and Greco-Roman mythology and religion, and eastern doctrines taken from Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta to present the idea of ancient wisdom handed down from the prehistoric times’ in service of furthering Mu’ist diffusionism.
Are you too, reader, getting the sense that there is a penchant here for the exotic blends of cultural connoisseurship that would become the discerning cosmopolitan audiences of the Haus of world cultures?
Following Dominik Intelmann’s anatomy of nazi resurgence in Chemnitz, Ana Teixeira Pinto’s unpacking of enlightenment sublime sheds light on just what a nasty bill of goods that ongoing project is. Right? Well, maybe there are some interesting, useful or redeeming features produced under that ‘regime of aesthetics’. I found myself the other day on the London overground thinking of Kant; that reclusive, aesthetic homebody, as a kind of proto Silicon Valley incel, building virtual worlds to protect himself from the horrors of the embodied sensuous world. Pinto cites Meg Armstrong’s The Effects of Blackness when she offers ‘just like Burke’s sublime, Hegel’s is marred by a parasitic relation to alterity, which burrows into the ‘’flesh it marks as other.’’ A formulation that can likely be applied well before Kant and Hegel and certainly in manifold relations of the contemporary. While reading passages like ‘Sublimity is a negative relationship: nature is an alienation in which spirit does not find itself. Nature is the negative because it negates the idea. The spirit must negate this negation…’ I feel like I’m back in GLUT, Johanna Hedva’s small black box installation at the outset of the exhibition that spins out a cacophonous bourgeois subjective interiority when you step inside until it becomes unbearable and you open the door, abruptly stopping the noise and returning you to social space. It occurs to me by the end of this lucid indictment, the enlightenment was not so much a negation or abolition of religion but rather an internalized version adopted by empire and articulated through the media of its day. Which by extension puts the metaverse in this long history of religion—or as Hito Steyerl asks, ‘how many AI’s can dance on the head of a pin?’ If you reread the above passage and replace ‘Spirit’ with ‘Meta’, its not hard to imagine an animated Mark Zuckerberg try to onboard you to Facebooks new platform.
As I advance through the catalogue it begins to feel extremely heavy with citations. I wonder if it’s a near total disconnect from meaningful politics that produces such a vigorous production of art and letters about politics. Without an ability to meaningfully participate in determining those issues of most consequence (war, welfare, borders, infrastructure, etc) something like a fragmented, aesthetically-oriented left is left to the realm of signs which feel about as effective as the hand-painted ones that flash for an instant outside the actual structures of power. To clarify, I’m unconvinced the reactionary flare ups of street protest and the reshuffling of politically themed works of art and literature constitute a materially significant form of politics. It has also glutted the possibility space of an already impoverished notion of art with works that articulate the inability of this provincial, retrograde conception of art to meaningfully address the sociopolitical and ecological crises of the world. It’s a bizarre and sad turn that art should be organized largely by its viability in the market and/or the claims it makes towards socioecological efficacy.
The texts in the catalogue are put into startling juxtaposition. It feels impossible to apprehend and synthesize the scope of concerns. White’s afropessimist Warring precedes Engster’s Secondary Original Accumulation and Complimentary Valorization in Illiberal Politics and Art, a familiar intersectional impasse of race and class. It’s quite a sight to behold Engster shoehorn western dualism into a due terminological update of ‘primitive accumulation.’ We’re given something like a cosmology with an ‘original accumulation’ creation story for the economic determinists. In a later text by Engster he suggests an unusual theory of the ‘intersectionality’ of capital, which useful or not, is a good example of how these connotative struggles play out—and how easy it is to get lost in the shifting terminological woods. It becomes almost like a Marxian Talmud, with endless troubling of categories; reframing, negating, expanding, and conditioning the argot. Listening to this high marxist intercourse is impressive to behold and I doubt it’s winning many friends and supporters.
In a recent talk with Anselm Franke on an interesting interview project and public lecture series called the Hope Recycling Station Franke was asked to a comment on some of Latour’s work. He replied that Latour and french thinkers generally were going to ‘pay dearly’ for their refusal of Marxism. The language made me laugh at first, maybe because it felt so dramatic, but I found myself thinking about it later. In my reading of recent Latour there seems to be an almost singular focus on challenging his audience to honestly inventory the land and labor they live off and from, and as the basis of determining the scope of their responsibilities and entanglements. This might not be a bad way into a lot of the things Marx was concerned with and it might be a more effective rhetorical strategy to communicate with people who recoil from the interminable use of the word ‘alienation’ as it accumulates in exceedingly Byzantine structures of irresolvable dialectics. And I say this as someone prone to using that kind of language.